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UNITED STATES v. NEW MEXICO:
REASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL
CONTRACTORS' CONSTITUTIONAL
IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION
The manner in which courts apply the doctrine of constitutional
immunity from state taxation' affects the vitality of state govern-
I Chief Justice Marshall announced the doctrine of federal constitutional immu-
nity from state taxation in M'Culloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
The doctrine is a theory of constitutional law absolutely barring states from levying
taxes on the national government and its instrumentalities. See Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (rule against taxing instrumentalities
of the United States is absolute in form and strict in substance); Johnson v. Maryland,
254 U.S. 51, 55 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (no matter how reasonable, universal, or nondis-
criminatory the levy, a state may not interfere with the United States by taxation);
Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 598 (1890) (states may not impede, burden,
or in any manner control the United States through taxation); Weston v. City Council
of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449,468 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (states may not tax in a
way that directly or indirectly burdens the United States; extent of burden is irrele-
vant); M'Culloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (Marshall, C.J.) (state
tax on an instrument of the United States is unconstitutional). Seegenerall, G. GUN-
THER CASES AND MATERIALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358-69 (1980); Pierce, Tax
Immunity Should Not Mean Tax Inequity, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 173 (sketches pre and
post 1937 development of doctrine, contends that the doctrine impairs the states' abil-
ity to meet the rising cost of state government); Powell, The Remnant of Intergovern-
mental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1945) (analysis of doctrine's
development from 1937 to 1945) [hereinafter cited as Powell, Remnant]; Powell, The
Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1945) (detailed
analysis of development and trends in the doctrine through 1937) [hereinafter cited as
Powell, Waning]; Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Pouwrs Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 682, 700-11 (1976); Comment, Federal Immunityfrom State Taxation: A Re-
assessment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (1978) (traces historical development of doctrine;
criticizes its absolutism).
Although the doctrine is a theory of constitutional law, it is not mentioned in the
Constitution. Its foundation is the constitutionally implied relationships between the
federal government and the governments of the individual states. C. BLACK, STRUC-
TURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1959). National supremacy is
central to the doctrine. Id See infra notes 14-30 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of early development of the doctrine.
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ments.2 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has not uni-
formly applied the doctrine to contractors with the federal
government.3 In United States v. New Mexico,4 the Court found con-
tractors with the Department of Energy outside the umbrella of fed-
eral immunity.
2. See Pierce, supra note 1, at 174, 189.
During the 1974-75 fiscal year, the states spent $86,326,000,000. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GF 75 No. 5, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN
1974-75, at 21 (1976). They spent $224,644,000,000 during the 1978-79 fiscal year.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GF 79 No. 5, GOVERNMENTAL
FINANCES IN 1978-79, at 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GF 79]. In four years, there-
fore, state expenditures increased 260%. While growth of state tax revenue paralleled
growth of state expenditures, state expenditures have risen faster than state tax in-
come. R. LEACH, AMERICAN FEDERALISM 211 (1970).
A state tax on federal activities within the state's borders would ease the state's
revenue woes. The contemporary doctrine of constitutional federal immunity from
state taxation, however, precludes the states from levying any tax on the federal gov-
ernment. See Comment, supra note 1, at 706. If the immunity applied only to dis-
criminatory state taxes, states could levy a sales tax on a federal purchaser. The
federal government paid $199,000,000,000 for goods and services during 1980. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1981, at 421 (1981). The government undoubtably made the vast
majority of those purchases in these states. A 5% state sales tax on 1980's federal
government purchases would yield almost $10,000,000,000. See GF 79, supra. Sales
tax is only one example of state taxes the federal government does not pay. The
manner of applying the doctrine, therefore, controls state access to a substantial
source of revenue.
3. Before 1937 the Supreme Court liberally found immunity per the M'Culloch
doctrine. The Court "almost always" found immunity whenever a state tax on a
party dealing with the federal government raised the cost of a federal operation.
Tribe, supra note 1, at 703, 706. In 1937, the Court decided James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). Dravo upheld a nondiscriminatory state tax on a
contractor's earnings from work performed within the state under a federal contract.
Id Since Dravo, the Court has rarely found immunity per the M'Culloch doctrine.
See Tribe, supra note I, at 704. The Court tends to find immunity only if the "legal
incidence" of a tax is on the United States. See Comment, supra note 1, at 701-06.
Nevertheless, some post-1937 decisions are inconsistent or turn on formal distinctions.
Compare United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 192 (1944) (invalidated
tax on federal property for-profit contractor used and possessed) and Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 116-22 (1959) (because contract called contractor
agent, Court invalidated sales tax on contractor building navy ammunition depot)
with City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489, 493 (1958) (sustained
personal property tax on federal property contractor possessed and used for personal
benefit) and Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1941) (upheld sales tax on
contractor building army base) and James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134
(1937) (exemption of federal agencies from state taxation does not depend upon the
fact that they are agents).
4. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
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The United States sought exemptions5 from New Mexico's gross
receipts, sales, and use taxes6 for three firms contracting with the De-
partment of Energy.7 An advanced funding procedure provided fed-
5. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 F. Supp. 993 (D. N.M. 1978). In the
principal case, New Mexico levied taxes on the contractors, not directly on the federal
government. Nevertheless, the United States challenged the taxes. Both the United
States and the Contractor have standing to question the propriety of a tax on the
contractor doing business with the federal government. See United States v. Alle-
gheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 191 (1944).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-16A-4, 72-16A-7 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code). New
Mexico's gross receipts tax was a 4% levy on the total revenue of each business in the
state. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-4 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code). The state as-
sessed the tax for the privilege of doing business in New Mexico. Id
The legal incidence of the tax falls upon the seller of goods or services, rather than
the buyer. See brief for New Mexico at 6, United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for New Mexico]. See also, Brief for the United
States at 25, United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for the United States]. In practice, however, New Mexico arguably levies a
gross receipts tax only against those "engaged in the construction business or in per-
forming services of a professional, technical, or scientific nature." See id at 6. Those
selling goods effectively collect a sales tax from customers. See id New Mexico con-
tends that no part of the gross receipts tax is legally comparable to a sales tax. Brief
for New Mexico at 6. Nevertheless, the Court treated the gross receipts tax as a tax on
sales to the contractors. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 741.
New Mexico's use tax was a levy on the value of goods purchased out of state but
used in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code).
The tax was 4% of the property's value. Id The state determined value as of the
purchase date or the date of introduction into New Mexico, whichever was later. Id
New Mexico levied the tax, however, only if the owner acquired the property in the
kind of transaction subject to the state's gross receipts tax. Id The state levies the tax
"to protect New Mexico businessmen from the unfair competition that would other-
wise result from the importation of property into the state without payment of a simi-
lar tax." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-2 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code). Thus, a New
Mexican buyer cannot avoid the state's 4% tax by making purchases out of state.
New Mexico amended its tax code in 1978. The state lowered the rate of its gross
receipts and compensating taxes from 4% to 31/2%. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-4, 7-9-7
(Supp. 1982). The federal government filed the claim involved in United States v.
New Mexico before New Mexico amended its tax code. None of the changes in the
code are important here. See 455 U.S. 720, 727 n.7.
7. The contractors were Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Western Electric
Company, Inc.; the Zia Company, a subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries, Inc.; and Los
Alamos Constructors, Inc., a subsidiary of Zia. Sandia was organized in 1949 and
does only federally sponsored research. It manages Sandia Laboratories, a federally-
owned installation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Paid-in capital of $1,000 in United
States bonds is Sandia's only property. Unlike Sandia, Zia owns property and does
private work. Zia manages the federally-owned Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
Zia organized Los Alamos Constructors in 1953. Los Alamos does only construction
and repair work at the federal installation Zia manages. Los Alamos Constructors
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eral monies to pay for the contractors' purchases.' The contractors
purchased goods in their own names but title passed directly to the
United States.9 Unknown to vendors, only the federal government
owns no personal property and makes all of its purchases through Zia. See United
States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 723-24.
New Mexico's gross receipts tax, see supra note 6, affected the contractors in three
ways. First, the state taxed fees the United States had paid the contractors. See 455
U.S. at 728. Second, Sandia and Zia had to pay tax on their purchases. Id The
statute, however, expressly exempted sales to the United States from taxation. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code). Finally, the contractors
had to pay tax on funds the United States advanced for the contractor's purchases.
455 U.S. at 728. The United States did not question New Mexico's levy on fees paid
to the contractors. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 15.
New Mexico expressly exempted the United States from its use tax. N.M.. STAT.
ANN. § 72-16A-12.3 (Supp. 1975) (superseded code). Nevertheless, New Mexico lev-
ied the tax on the contractors' in-state use of federal property purchased outside New
Mexico. 455 U.S. at 728.
The contractors involved here made agreements with the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC). In 1975, the United States transferred responsibility for the nation's nu-
clear program from the AEC to the Energy Research and Development
Administration. 455 U.S. at 723 n.1. The Depart of Energy (DOE) assumed respon-
sibility for the program in 1977. Id Thus, the contracts were between (DOE) and the
contractors at the times in question.
8. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 725. The Supreme Court described
advanced funding as an accounting device
designed to provide up-to-date meaningful records of costs and controls of prop-
erty, as well as to 'speed up reimbursement of contractors. . . . The procedure
allows contractors to pay creditors and employees with drafts drawn on a special
bank account in which United States Treasury funds are deposited. . .. The
contractor pays its expenses by drawing on the account. . . . The United States
owns the account balance.
455 U.S. at 725-26. The court of appeals similarly described advanced funding, dis-
missing it as "simply another means of reimbursement designed by accountants."
New Mexico v. United States, 624 F.2d 117, 122 (10th Cir. 1980).
The United States strenuously objected to the courts' suggestion that advanced
funding is "simply" an accounting device. See Brief for the United States, supra note
6, at 14, 33. The government insisted that there is a "considerable difference between
the case where the contractor expends its own funds and must await reimbursement
.. . and the case in which the contractor is empowered to draw directly on the funds
of the government." Id at 14, 33. The United States' argument proceeded as follows.
First, the advanced funding procedure effectively gave the contractors power to com-
mit the federal government's credit. See id at 33. Second, the power to commit fed-
eral funds made the contractors federal agents. Id Third, federal agents are cloaked
with federal immunity from state taxation according the Kern-Limerick, Inc. v.
Scurlock, 347 U.S. 154 (1954). Id at 19-20. See infra notes 52 to 62 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Kern-Limerick.
9. 455 U.S. at 724. The contractors never had an owner's interest in their
purchases. Id
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had an independent interest in the purchases."0 Each contractor
stood to benefit from its relationship with the federal government."
Rejecting the government's agency based argument for immunity, 2 a
unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment
for New Mexico.' 3
10. Id at 1387. But see Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 31. In its
brief, the United States argues that vendors had notice of the government's ultimate
interest in purchases by Sandia or Zia. The government notes that Zia's checks
stated, "A.E.C. Advance Funds/Payroll Account. . . " or "U.S. Energy Research
and Development Administration Advance Funds Account." Id Similarly, Sandia's
checks stated, "Sandia Laboratories. . . Operated by Sandia Corporation [for] En-
ergy Research and Development Administration/Advance Funds Account." Id The
legends on the contractors' checks arguably notify vendors that the United States is
the real purchaser when the contractors buy goods. Such notice is important because
the Court cites lack of such notice to distinguish United States v. New Mexico from
arguably controlling precedent. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. De-
spite the importance of the point, the court fails to address the government's
argument.
11. See 455 U.S. at 724 & n.3, 740 n.13. Zia and Los Alamos Constructors had
cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. Clearly, fees received over and above costs are benefits.
Sandia's profit, however, is not so apparent. Sandia and its parent, Western Electric,
"are guaranteed royalty-free irrevocable licenses for any communications related dis-
coveries or inventions developed by most Sandia employees during the course of the
contract . . and the company receives complete reimbursement for salary outlays
and other expenditures." Id at 740 n.13. Thus, Sandia gains free training for its
employees, free research facilities, and free use of government-owned inventions or
discoveries. Id at 724 n.3.
12. Id at 742-43. See infra note 8, 88 and accompanying text for discussions of
the United States' argument.
13. Id at 744. The district court held the contractors immune from New Mexico's
gross receipts tax as applied to purchases. United States v. New Mexico, 455 F. Supp.
993, 997-98 (D. N.M. 1978). The court found the contractors to be procurement
agents for the United States because the government retained control of the contrac-
tors' actions while permitting the contractors to buy property for the government with
federal monies. Id The court relied on Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S.
110 (1954). See id at 455 F. Supp. at 996-97. In that case, the Supreme Court had
held a federal procurement agent immune from a state sales tax. See infra notes 52-
62 and accompanying text discussing Kern-Limerick. The court also found New
Mexico's compensating tax to be merely a correlate of the state's sales tax. Id at 998.
The court, therefore, again employed its sales tax rationale to hold the contractors
immune from the use tax. Id Finally, the court held that funds advanced for
purchases are not compensation and, therefore, not taxable as gross receipts. Id at
997-99.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, emphasizing a policy of
maintaining "the delicate financial balance between our coexisting sovereignties."
See New Mexico v. United States, 624 F.2d 111, 116 (10th Cir. 1980). The court of
appeals found the contractors insufficiently incorporated into the government to war-
rant calling them instrumentalities. See id at 118. Only a federal instrumentality, the
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Chief Justice Marshall announced the doctrine of constitutional
federal immunity from state taxation in M'Culloch v. Maryland 14 In
M'Culloch, the state of Maryland sued the cashier of the Baltimore
branch of the Bank of the United States' 5 for issuing notes without
paying a discriminatory state tax. 6 Chief Justice Marshall held the
legislation incorporating the bank a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' powers because the Bank was Congress' instrument for achiev-
ing enumerated constitutional goals. 7 Chief Justice Marshall argued
appellate court asserted, can claim federal immunity from state taxation. Id (citing
United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 43 (1964)). See infra notes 63-72 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Boyd)
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the seemingly intractable
problems posed by state taxation of federal contractors." United States v. New Mex-
ico, 455 U.S. 730.
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
15. The Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 authorized creation of the Bank
of the United States. The United States' first constitutional Congress had previously
established a bank, but its authorizing legislation had expired. M'Culloch v. Mar'.
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
16. Maryland's statute required banks and branches of banks lacking a Maryland
charter to issue notes only on specifically stamped paper available from the state. The
state charged a tax upon issuance of the paper. The levy was proportional to the
value of the note to be issued. Banks could avoid the tax only by advance payment of
an annual state fee. The Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States was the
only bank without a Maryland charter in the state. The notes it issued were not on
Maryland's stamped paper. The bank had not paid the state's annual fee. 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 319 (reporter's statement of facts).
1-7. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-24. Note that Chief Justice Marshall implicitly
assumed that Congress' enumerated powers under the Constitution, art. I, § 8, are
ends for congressional achievement. Id
Chief Justice Marshall made two arguments to support the holding that Congress
may constitutionally charter a bank. The first argument begins with the premise that
the federal government may exercise only those powers the Constitution grants it. Id.
at 405. The Constitution gives Congress power to collect taxes, borrow money, regu-
late commerce, declare and conduct war, and raise and support an army and navy.
Id at 407. A government entrusted with such powers must have ample means for
their execution. See id at 408-09. The Constitution does not bar creation of a corpo-
ration if a corporation is essential to the beneficial exercise of Congress' enumerated
powers. Id at 408. Corporations are means to an end. They are not ends in them-
selves. Id at 408. Therefore, the Constitution implies that Congress has the power to
create corporations, including banks. See id Thus, the legislation incorporating the
Bank was a law "of the United States. . . made in Pursuance" of the Constitution
and, consequently, was the supreme law of the land. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
The second argument rests on the "necessary and proper" clause. Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution expressly gives Congress power "to make all laws which shall be
Necessary and Proper for carrying into Execution" Congress' enumerated powers.
Id at 411-12. The "necessary and proper" clause, therefore, makes constitutional all
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that taxation of congressional means or instruments for achieving
constitutional goals contravenes the Constitution's supremacy
clause.'I Chief Justice Marshall concluded, therefore, that states may
not tax valid congressional enactments effectuating legitimate federal
exercises of constitutional authority.' 9
The M'Culloch opinion fashions an absolute immunity from state
taxation for the federal government and its instrumentalities.2" Nev-
means that are appropriate to a legitimate goal and not otherwise prohibited. Id at
421. Thus, the act to incorporate the bank is a constitutional means for Congress'
execution of its enumerated powers. As such, it is a part of the supreme law of the
land. Id See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 92-106.
18. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426, 430. The "supremacy" clause states:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S, CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
Chief Justice Marshall called the bank an instrument ofthe United States. 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 432. That characterization is curious in light of the language of the
bank's authorizing legislation. Section one of the authorizing act called for establish-
mg the bank with $35,000,000 capital. The United States was to contribute 20% of the
capital, while 80% was to come from "individuals, companies, or corporations." Act
of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266. The Bank's predominant private ownership calls
into question the propriety of calling the Bank a government instrument. See Plous
and Baker, M'Culloch v. Maryland Right Princple, Wrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REV.
710, 712-13 (1957).
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436-37. In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall first con-
cluded that the bank's authorizing legislation is part of the supreme law of the land.
See supra note 17. Chief Justice Marshall then argued as follows. The Constitution
and laws made under it are supreme. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426. Consequently, when
state laws conflict with national laws, the national law must prevail. See id at 430-32.
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy." Id at 431. Therefore, permitting
state taxes on the instruments of the federal government gives the states power to
destroy those instruments. Id at 431-432. Such a situation reverses the national
supremacy that the Constitution expressly declares. Id at 432. The people of one
state cannot give that government power to tax something the representatives of all
the people and all the states created. Id Thus, the taxing power of the states cannot
reach instruments of the national government. Id at 436.
20. See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (rule against
taxing instrumentalities of the United States is absolute in form and strict in sub-
stance); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (no matter how
reasonable, universal, or nondiscriminatory the levy, a state may not interfere with
the United States by taxation); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 598 (1890)
(states may not impede, burden, or in any manner control the United States through
taxation). See generally Tribe, supra note 1, at 701 ("M'Culloch thus announced the
prophylactic per se rule that has followed ever since."); Comment, supra note 1 at 695.
Chief Justice Marshall formulated the M'Culloch problem as one of clashing sover-
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ertheless, the opinion does not define "instrument."'" Similarly, the
opinion does not plainly declare whether the federal government and
its instruments are immune from all taxes or only discriminatory or
direct taxes.22 Thus, M'Culloch fails to articulate the precise scope of
constitutional federal immunity from state taxation.
In a subsequent case, Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 23 Chief
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, clearly indicates that the fed-
eral government and its instrumentalities are immune from all state
taxes.24 In Weston, the Court invalidated a state measure consequen-
tial
, 
burdening a federal operation.25 Employing an economic bur-
den test,26 the Court held that states may not impose a tax directly or
eignties. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430. The Court decided M'Culloch in
1819, only 30 years after ratification of the Constitution. The emerging national gov-
ernment might well have needed protection from state encroachment. See generaly
G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 92-108. The absolute protection M'Culloch gave the
national government is an anachronism today. Comment, supra note 1, at 716. In-
deed, intergovernmental collaboration may be the essence of contemporary United
States federalism. See D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE
STATES 53-61 (1966). See also supra note 2 and authorities cited therein.
21. M'Culloch merely uses instrumentality interchangeably with means. See, e.g.,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432.
22. Chief Justice Marshall indicated recognition of broad state taxing powers and
infrequent application of federal immunity from state taxes when he concluded,
This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally
possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in
common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on
the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in com-
mon with other property of the same description throughout the State. But this is
a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a tax on the operation
of an instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers
into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436-37. Moreover, the tax involved in M'Culloch affected only
the Bank of the United States. M'Culloch, therefore, arguably provides immunity
only when a state discriminatorily taxes the United States or its instrumentalities. See
First Ag. Nat'l Bank of Berkshire Cnty. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 350
(1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But cf. Weston v. City Council of Charleston. 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 479 (1829) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (M'Culloch means states may
not directy tax the United States). Weston, however, clearly indicates that the United
States is exempt from all state taxes. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
23. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 468 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (states may not tax in a way
that directly of indirectly burdens the federal government; extent of burden is
irrelevant).
24. See id at 468.
25. See id at 468-69.
26. See id at 468. Under the economic burden test, courts find federal immunity
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indirectly burdening the federal government to any extent.2 7
After Weston, the Court customarily found immunity when a tax
in question placed an economic burden on the United States by rais-
ing the cost of a federal operation. 8 Thus, the economic burden test
obviated the need to define "instrumentality." Despite its custom,
the Court occasionally found an economic burden, but refused to find
immunity.29
if the United States ultimately pays the levy. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 254 U.S.
51, 55-56 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
27. See Weston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 468-69. Subsequent courts adopted the eco-
nomic burden test to determine if a state tax consequentially burdens the federal gov-
ernment. See, e.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 222
(1928) (Court invalidated state gross receipts tax on contractor selling gasoline to the
federal government because the tax burdened the relationship between the contractor
and the United States). The economic burden test indicates that a contractor is im-
mune from a state tax whenever the tax increases a government operation's cost to the
United States. See id See also Tribe, supra note 1, at 706. Under a cost-plus con-
tract. for example, the economic burden of a tax falls on the government as the ulti-
mate payor because the taxes are reimbursable expenses. Thus, cost-plus federal
contractors would be exempt from state taxes. The economic burden test indicates
immunity for virtually anyone involved in an economic relationship with the United
States. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) (barring state
tax on a federal officer). See also Tribe, supra note 1, at 703.
28. Tribe, supra note 1, at 706. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.
134, 161-70 (Roberts, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein. See also Powell,An Im-
agnary, Judicial Opinion, 44 HARV. L. Rnv. 889 (1931) (reviewing early cases involv-
ing federal immunity from state taxes).
The doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation reached its greatest scope
between 1870 and 1930. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 359. Collector v. Day, 78
U.S. (I I Wall.) 113 (1871) made tax immunity reciprocal. In that case, the Court held
a state official exempt from federal income tax. See id The M'Culloch Court had
rejected the suggestion that state and federal taxing powers are equal and, therefore,
subject to the same limitations. G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 359. M'Culloch indi-
cated that the federal government may tax state institutions as long as the levies are
uniform. See 17 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 435-36. The Court said federal sovereignty comes
from all the people of the United States. Id Thus, the federal government taxes its
constituents when it taxes a state institution. See id. A state's sovereignty comes only
from the people of that state. Id Thus, the state government can act only on the
people of that state. Id
29. See Powell, Waning, supra note 1, at 634-35. In Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v.
Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934), the court found an economic burden on the United
States, yet refused to find immunity. Trinityfarm was a contractor constructing levees
for the United States. Trinityarm sought exemption from Louisiana's gasoline tax.
The Court determined that the contractor's payment did not place a direct or immedi-
ate burden on the United States. Id at 472. At most, the government's burden was
consequential and remote. Id The Court, therefore, concluded that the contractor's
claim of immunity lacked foundation. Id The Court also stated that independent
contractors are not government instrumentalities. Id at 472. Thus, Trinityfarm per-
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James v. Dravo Contracting Co.3" involved an independent con-
tractor who had agreed to build locks and dams for the United States
on navigable streams in West Virginia. The state levied its gross
receipts tax on income Dravo had received from the United States.
Dravo claimed federal immunity and sought to enjoin collection of
the tax. The Supreme Court determined that Dravo was an in-
dependent contractor rather than a government instrumentality.3'
The Court rejected Dravo's economic burden argument. 32 There-
fore, the Court found the contractor to be outside the reach of consti-
tutional federal immunity.33
Justice Roberts wrote a strong dissent in Dravo, highlighting the
Court's break with a century of economic burden test precedents and
arguing that the Court misconstrued the M'Culloch doctrine.34 Jus-
tice Roberts emphasized that the M'Culloch doctrine rests on the fed-
eral government's constitutional supremacy over the states.35 He
suggested that the Court's rejection of the economic burden test im-
pairs the United States' ability to perform its duties by preventing the
federal government from freely hiring agents when it would be expe-
mits the inference that federal immunity protects only instrumentalities from state
taxes and expressly eliminates independent contractors from the ranks of federal
instrumentalities.
30. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
31. Id at 160.
32. Id at 149.
33. See id at 152-57. The Court set Dravo apart from cases in which it had found
immunity. The Court noted that some cases in which it had found immunity in-
volved taxes on the government, its property, or its officers, but that was not true in
Dravo. Id at 149. The Court also had found immunity in cases involving discrimi-
natory taxes, but West Virginia's tax was nondiscriminatory. Id at 149-51. The
Court had found immunity in cases involving a state tax of a government contract.
West Virginia did not tax Dravo's contract with the United States. Id at 149-50. In
still other cases, acts of Congress had been involved. That was not the case in Drao.
Id at 150-51. The Court deemed other pre-Dravo immunity cases limited to their
particular facts. Id at 151.
34. See 302 U.S. at 161-186 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts contended
that the Dravo Court overruled, subsilentio, more than 100 years of economic burden
test precedents. 302 U.S. at 161 (Roberts, J. dissenting). Indeed, it appears that the
Dravo Court could have reached its conclusion based on Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v.
Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934). See supra note 29 for a discussion of Trinityfarm.
Mere reliance upon Trinityfarm would not have changed the course of the law. Thus,
the Court seemingly intended to overrule the long line of cases following Weston v.
City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829). See supra notes 23-29 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Weston and cases following it.
35. 302 U.S. at 171-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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dient to do so.36 Justice Roberts concluded that neither policy37 nor
precedent 38 supported West Virginia's levy on contractors with the
federal government.
The line of cases following Dravo created the legal incidence test
for constitutional federal immunity from state taxation. The legal in-
cidence test requires courts to determine which party the state legisla-
36. Id at 163.
37 See id at 161-62. Justice Roberts argued that the Court's decision jeopardized
two public policies: federal supremacy and predictable application of the law. Id
Justice Roberts failed to consider relevant political and economic environments. The
Court decided M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) very soon after
adoption of the Constitution, while the debilitating effects of state supremacy under
the Articles of Confederation were fresh. Protecting the national government from
state encroachment was a paramount concern of the Constitution's drafters. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison). The same concern influenced Chief Justice Mar-
shall and his major opinions reflect that concern. In addition to M'Culloch, see, e.g.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (defining federal commerce power).
See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 92-106.
Passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913, permitting federal taxation of individual
income without apportionment among the states, assured the national government's
security vis-a-vis the states because the federal government quickly became the repos-
itory of the vast majority of the nation's tax revenues. See ELAZAR, Supra note 20, at
62. The federal government responded to the depression of the 1930's by creating
numerous national programs requiring financial and administrative centralization.
R. LEACH, supra note 2, at 197. Centralization further entrenched the federal govern-
ment and further established federal dominance in the political sphere.
In 1937, the same year it decided Dravo, Supreme Court decisions facilitated fed-
eral forays into economic regulation and other traditional state areas. In the leading
case of National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), the Court granted an injunction prohibiting Jones & Laughlin from firing
employees for unionizing activity. In upholding the National Labor Relations Act,
Jones & Laughlin allows federal regulation of intrastate industry if it affects com-
merce among the states or with foreign nations. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
the Court upheld the federal government's power to encourage state action through
tax credits. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Both Jones & Laughlin and Steward Machine pre-
ceded Dravo. Thus, before the court opened the door to state taxation of contractors
performing federal functions, it had allowed the federal government to take an active
role in areas previously reserved to the states.
With the federal government secured against state domination, the historical reason
for protecting the United States from state taxation disappeared. While there has
always been some cooperation between the national and state governments, ELAZAR,
supra note 20, at 54, the scope and extent of intergovernmental cooperation has con-
tinually increased. Id at 53. The problems facing the nation in 1937 certainly re-
quired cooperative federalism, not M'Culloch's theory of clashing sovereignties.
38. Justice Roberts attacked the Court's rationale by impeaching its precedents.
See 302 U.S. at 172-75.
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ture intended to tax.39 Immunity applies if the legislature intends to
tax the United States or its instrumentality."a The Court did not ar-
ticulate a test for determining when a nongovernmental entity is a
federal instrumentality.41 Nevertheless, the requirements are strin-
gent.42 Absent a state tax directly on the United States, 3 constitu-
tional federal immunity from state taxation is usually inappropriate
under the legal incidence test.
Soon after Dravo, the Supreme Court applied the legal incidence
test in Alabama v. King & Boozer.4 In King & Boozer, a lumber
dealer sued the state to enjoin collection of sales tax on lumber sold
to a contractor building an Army base under a cost-plus contract.4a
Pursuant to the contract, the United States held title to any goods the
contractor purchased. Further, the federal government maintained
extensive control over all purchases. The United States ultimately
paid for the goods because the government reimbursed the contractor
39. See Comment, supra note 1, at 702. While the economic burden of a tax does
not determine legal incidence, it may indicate legislative intent. See Id at 703.
40. See id
41. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1966)
(there is no simple test for instrumentality, but factors to look for include federal
charter, government supervision, government appointment of officers, and statutory
responsibility) (American Red Cross is an instrumentality). But cf. Livingston v.
United States, 364 U.S. 281 (1980) (private, for-profit corporation voluntarily
designed, built, and operated a defense plant without recompense granted tax immu-
nity as federal instrumentality), affigper cur/am 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. S.C. 1959).
42. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1966)
(instrumentality must be an arm of the government); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.
of America, 355 U.S. 489, 503 (1958) (instrumentality must stand in the government's
shoes); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958) (instrumen-
tality must be so assimilated by government as to become one of its constituent parts;
contractor is not an instrumentality); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485
(1942) (instrumentality is an arm of the government). Cf. United States v. Boyd, 378
U.S. 39, 48 (1964) (suggests that profit-making contractor cannot be government
instrumentality).
43. See Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943) (The Court found a Florida
fee for inspecting fertilizer owned by the United States to be a tax on the federal
government and held that the supremacy clause freed the United States from paying
the fee.) See also United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460 (1977) ("So
long as the tax is not directly laid on the Federal Government, it is valid if
nondiscriminatory. .. ").
44. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
45. See id at 6-7. The tax statute made the seller liable for a percentage of sales
receipts, designating the seller the taxpayer. Id Nevertheless, the statute also re-
quired the seller to collect the amount owed on each purchase from the purchaser. Id
Thus, the tax's legal incidence was on the purchaser. Id at 7.
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for all purchases.46 The Supreme Court upheld the levy in King &
Boozer, finding that the legislature had intended to tax the contrac-
tor-purchaser and the contractor was not an instrumentality of the
United States.47 The Court expressly rejected economic burden ar-
guments.48 Dictum implied that the legal incidence of a tax shifts to
the United States if a contract's language renders a contractor a fed-
eral agent.49
In Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,50 the Court held a contractor a
federal purchasing agent and, therefore, exempt from a state sales
tax. In Kern-Limerick, a tractor dealer sued Arkansas' tax commis-
sioner, seeking refund of sales tax paid under protest.-1 A contractor
building an ammunition dump for the Navy had purchased two trac-
tors from Kern-Limerick for the construction. 2 An Arkansas statute
required the seller to pay a tax on the sale and to collect the levy from
the purchaser.5 3 The Court distinguished Kern-Limerick from King
& Boozer on the basis of contractual language expressly making the
Kern-Limerick contractor a government purchasing agent.54 The
Court held that the contract had shifted the tax's legal incidence from
the contractor to the United States.55
Kern-Limerick's emphasis on contractual language raised form
above substance. 6 The Court discounted the substantive similarity
of Kern-Limerick and King & Boozet; including the fact that in both
cases, the legislature had intended the contractors to pay the tax.57
46. 314 U.S. at 10, 13.
47 Seeid at 14.
48 Seeid at 16.
49. Id at 12.
50. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
51. Id at 113.
52. Id. at 111.
53. Id at 111-12.
54. Comment, supra note 1, at 704. See 347 U.S. at 112 n.2. For a discussion of
King & Boozer, see supra note 57-64 and accompanying text.
55. Kern-Limerick, 347 U.S. at 120-21.
56 See Tribe, supra note 1, at 7 10; Comment, supra note 1, at 704. Indeed, the
Kern-Limerick Court stated that under its holding, "the form of contracts. . . may
determine the effect of state taxation on federal agencies." 347 U.S. at 122-23.
57. See Kern-Limerick, 347 U.S. at 118-19. Both Kern-Limerick and King &
Boozer involved a contractor doing construction work for the United States military.
347 U.S. at 110; King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 1. The contractor in each case had a cost-
plus contract so the United States reimbursed all construction costs. In both cases, the
contractors purchased goods subject to state sales tax for use in the construction. The
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The Court's assertion that the Kern-Limerick contract shifted the
tax's legal incidence is unconvincing. The legal incidence of a tax
falls on the party the legislature intended to tax.58 A contract cannot
change the legislature's intent. The Kern-Limerick Court, therefore,
effectively ignored the true legal incidence of Arkansas' sales tax.
The Court simply found immunity because the tax's economic bur-
den fell on the United States.59
The Court's Kern-Limerick opinion implies that agents of the fed-
eral government are constitutionally immune from state taxes.60 In
United States v. Boyd 6' the Court returned to its pre-Kern-Limerick
application of the legal incidence test to find that federal contractors
lacked constitutional immunity from Arkansas' use tax. In Boyd, the
Atomic Energy Commission sued Tennessee to recover use taxes the
contractors had paid.62 The contractors performed management and
construction services on a cost-plus-fee basis at a federally owned
atomic facility. 63 The contractors paid for purchases with advanced
federal funds.' Only the United States had an ownership interest in
goods the contractors bought.65 The contractors managed their daily
affairs while the Commission retained the right to supervise them di-
rectly.66 Applying the legal incidence test, the Court found that the
sales tax was a reimbursable cost under both contracts. Thus, in both cases, the ulti-
mate burden of the tax fell on the United States. In both cases, however, the state
intended to tax the contractor, not the federal government. See supra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text discussing Alabama v. King & Boozer; notes 50-59 and accompa-
nying text discussing Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock.
58. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text discussing the legal incidence
test.
59. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 710.
60. See 347 U.S. at 112 n.2.
61. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
62. Id at 43. Plaintiffs also sought recovery of sales taxes the contractors had
paid. The Court did not consider the issue because the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
relying on Kern-Limerick, found the contractors to be federal purchasing agents. Id.
at 43 n.5. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text discussing Kern-Limerick v.
Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). Thus, the sales tax fell on the United States and the
federal immunity doctrine barred the levy. Neither party sought review of Tennes-
see's sales tax decision. Id
63. Boyd, 378 U.S. at 41, 43.
64. See id at 41, 43. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text discussing
advanced funding.
65. See 378 U.S. at 41, 42-43.
66. Id. at 42.
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state had taxed the contractors, not the federal government.67 The
Court equated federal agents with federal instrumentalities. 68 The
Court next rejected arguments that the contractors were federal
agents, declaring that contractors profiting from their relationship
with the government cannot be federal instrumentalities.69 Thus, the
Court found that the contractors were not constitutionally immune
from Tennessee's use tax.70
To summarize, the preceding review of Supreme Court decisions
suggests lack of a principled basis for applying the M'Culloch doc-
trine. For more than one hundred years, the Court employed an eco-
nomic burden test to find immunity if the United States ultimately
paid a tax.7 ' Nevertheless, the Court occasionally found an eco-
nomic burden without also finding immunity.72 In James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., the Court ignored over one hundred years of au-
thority for liberally applying the doctrine.7 3 Supreme Court cases
following Dravo enunciated a legal incidence test for evaluating con-
tractors' claims of constitutional immunity from state taxes.74 In
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,75 however, the Court arguably ap-
plied an economic burden test.7 6 The Court employed the legal inci-
dence test in subsequent cases 7 7 United States v. New Mexico 78 gave
67. See id at 44.
68. See id at 46-47, 48.
69. See id. at 48.
70, See id
71 See Tribe, supra note 1, at 706 (Employing the economic burden test, "immu-
nity was almost always implied when the state tax would otherwise have increased the
cost of the government's operations."). See also supra notes 14-29 and accompanying
text discussing the M'Culloch doctrine's pre-1937 history.
72. See, e.g.. Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934) (discussed
supra, note 29). See also Powell, Waning, supra note 1, at 634-35 and cases cited
therein.
73. See 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
74. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text discussing the legal incidence
test.
75. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text discussing Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
76. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 710 ("An economic burden test might appear dif-
ferent from a formal one, but would likewise delegate discretionary authority. . . to
federal ... agencies. enabling them to immunize third parties. . . by contracting
to absorb the costs of the tax."). See also Comment, supra note 1, at 704 ("Kern-
Limerick . . . allows the government. . . to restore to private parties the very im-
munity withdrawn by King & Boozer. ").
77. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958)
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the Court an opportunity to clarify the law regarding federal contrac-
tors' constitutional immunity from state taxes.
In United States v. New Mexico, the Court first reviewed the basis,
history, and purpose of the M'Culloch doctrine, concluding that con-
fusing precedents necessitate a return to the doctrine's underlying
constitutional principle.79 The Court recognized the doctrine's basis
in the supremacy clause, but suggested that M'Culloch itself permits
extensive state taxing powers.8" While noting that M'Culloch argua-
bly exempts the United States from only discriminatory state taxes,
the Court recognized that the Supreme Court has never questioned
the propriety of absolute federal immunity from state taxes.8 Rely-
ing on M'Culloch, the Court determined that the constitutional im-
munity doctrine's purpose is to prevent conflicts between sovereigns
by barring states from laying demands directly on the federal govern-
ment.82 Thus, the Court rejected Chief Justice Marshall's extension
of M'Culloch to encompass consequential state burdens on the fed-
eral government.83 The Court concluded that this view retains the
doctrine's historically absolute nature and achieves the doctrine's
purpose of avoiding clashing sovereignty, while limiting the doc-
(upholding state tax on private use of federal property); United States v. Township of
Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958) (upholding state tax on private use of federal prop-
erty); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) (upholding state tax on
private use of federal property); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964) (upholding
state use tax on federal contractor). See also supra notes 62-70 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Boyd Kern-Limerick, however, remains good law.
78. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
79. See id at 733.
80. See id
81. See id. at 735-36. It is generally accepted that a state may not impose a tax
that discriminates against the United States. See, e.g., First Ag. Nat'l Bank of Berk-
shire Cnty. v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Montana, 437 F. Supp. 354 (D. Mont. 1977) rev'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 147 (1978); Comment, supra note 2, at 706. Thus, a state tax affecting a
federal operation must equally affect state operations. See, e.g., Moses Lake Homes,
Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Ind. School
Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1959). Nevertheless, a state may differentiate between entities
when assigning the legal incidence of a tax as long as the resulting economic burdens
are equal. Washington v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1344, 1349 (1983) (5-4 decision
upholding a state sales tax on federal contractors but no other contractors because the
state levied a corresponding tax on the owners of other construction projects).
82. 455 U.S. at 735-36.
83. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text discussing Chief Justice Mar-
shall's explanation of the M'Culloch doctrine in Westin v. City of Charleston, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
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trine's restraint of state taxing power.84
The United States v. New Mexico Court next adopted the legal in-
cidence test for contractors' claims of constitutional federal immu-
nity.85 The Court indicated that only the legal burden of a tax, not its
economic burden, is germane to an inquiry concerning constitutional
immunity. 6 The government conceded that the contractors bore the
legal incidence of the taxes and the Court agreed without
discussion. 7
The United States contended that the Kern-Limerick rule ex-
empted the contractors from state taxation because they were
purchasing agents acting on the government's behalf.88 In the final
step of its analysis, therefore, the Court considered whether the con-
tractors were immune from state taxation because they were federal
agents.
The Court recognized that entities can be sufficiently intertwined
with the federal government to be indistinguishable from it.89 Like
the United States itself, such entities are exempt from state taxes. 90
The Court asserted, however, that finding a contractor constitution-
ally immune from state taxation requires more than a traditional
principal-agent relationship.9 The contractor "must actually 'stand
in the Government's shoes.' "92 The test is whether the contractors
84. 455 U.S. at 735-36. The Court's opinion recognizes the historical necessity of
absolute federal immunity from state taxes. Id at 735. Nevertheless, the Court indi-
cates that the doctrine has only symbolic importance today. Id at 735.
85. 455 U.S. at 735 n.11 (The "economic-as opposed to the legal-incidence" of
a state tax is not "relevant" to federal tax immunity.).
86. See id
87. See id at 738.
88. Brief for the United States at 20, United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720
(1982). The government contended that the power to commit federal funds is the
essence of a purchasing agent. See id That is the view expressed in United States v.
Forst, 569 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1978) ("key factor" was whether credit of the United
States or the contractor was bound by the purchase agreements). Similarly, the dis-
trict court found that position compelling and agreed that the advanced funding pro-
cedure gave the contractors power to pledge federal funds. United States v. New
Mexico, 455 F. Supp. 993, 996 (D. N.M. 1978). That power, the court argued, com-
bined with the government's control over the contractors' purchases, made the con-
tractors federal procurement agents entitled to immunity from state taxes. See id at
997.
89. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 735.
90. Id
91. Id at 736.
92. Id. (quoting City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 503 (1958)). An
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were independent of the United States.93 If the Court finds indepen-
dence, the contractor is not a federal instrumentality. The Court in-
dicated that this requirement would prevent contract language from
determining how the Constitution applies to a contractor.94
agency standard is less strict than the instrumentality standard the Court has adopted.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY defines agency, principal, and agent as
follows:
1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of con-
sent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and consent by the other so to act.
2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
3) The one who is to act is the agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957). The RESTATEMENT defines master,
servant, and independent contractor as follows:
1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his af-
fairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the
other in the performance of the service.
2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is sub-
ject to the right to control by the master.
3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
Id § 2. Thus, an independent contractor can be the United States' agent. Based on
an agent-principal relationship, the Court found a federal contractor immune from
state sales tax in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). The Court has
also indicated that it would have found immunity if there had been an agent-principal
relationship. See, e.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 13 (1941). The con-
tractor cannot be a servant while maintaining its independence, its freedom from the
master's right to control. Thus, a master-servant relationship is closer and presents a
stricter standard than a principal-agent relationship. The Court has indicated in dicta
that a master-servant relationship between the United States and a contractor would
place the contractor within the umbrella of federal immunity from state taxes. See,
e.g., United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958). In other
cases, the court has rejected immunity claims based on such a relationship. See, e.g.,
United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 42 (1964) (The Court did not find immunity de-
spite government's retention and exercise of "the right to control, direct, and super-
vise the performance of the work.").
The instrumentality standard the Court has adopted requires more than a princi-
pal-agent or master-servant relationship. Indeed, it appears to require an absolute
identity of interests between the United States and the taxpayer claiming immunity.
See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 740 (1982) ("The congruence of
professional interests between the contractors and the Federal Government is not
complete . . . "). See also supra notes 41, 42 discussing the Court's notion of
instrumentality.
93. See 455 U.S. at 738.
94. See id at 737.
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The Court relied on that United States v. Boyd to resolve the inde-
pendence issue.9 5 The Boyd Court rejected the United States' claim
of federal contractors' constitutional immunity from Tennessee's use
tax because the contractors had been independent of the United
States, rather than federal instrumentalities.96 The Court based its
finding of independence on the contractors' pursuit of private prof-
its.97 In United States v. New Mexico, the Court found that the gov-
ernment contracts had served the contractors' private interests.98
Thus, the Court concluded, consistent with Boyd, that the contractors
had been independent of the United States.99
After finding the contractors independent of the United States, the
Court easily disposed of the claims of constitutional immunity from
New Mexico's use tax and gross receipts tax. The Court held, relying
on Bo ,d, that the contractors in United States v. New Mexico are not
constitutionally immune from New Mexico's use tax."°° The Court
relied on James v. Dravo Contracting Co. to dispose of the claim of
constitutional immunity from gross receipts tax.10 The Dravo Court
had found an independent contractor insufficiently connected with
the United States to share immunity from a state gross receipts tax. 10 2
Thus, the United States v. New Mexico Court held, consistently with
Dravo, that New Mexico's gross receipts tax is a constitutional levy
on an independent contractor.10 3
95. See id See also supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
96. 378 U.S. at 48.
97, See id
98 See 455 U.S. at 739.
99. See id The Court found that the contractors were not constituent parts of the
federal government. See id If the contractors were not part of the government, they
must be independent of the government. Thus, finding that federal contractors are
not constituent parts of the government accords with Boyd's conclusion that contrac-
tors doing business with the United States are independent of the government.
100. See id at 740-4 1. As in Boyd, the Court found that the contractors in United
States v. New Mexico profited from their relationship with the federal government.
455 U.S. at 740. Given that finding, the Court, as in Boyd, concluded that the con-
tractors were independent of the United States. See 378 U.S. at 48. Boyd's logic
demanded, therefore, that United States v. New Mexico uphold New Mexico's use tax
levy on the contractors. See id
101 See id at 741. See supra notes 30-3 8 and accompanying text for a discussion
of James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
102 See 302 U.S. at 157 (applying to Dravo the reasoning of Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)).
103. See 455 U.S. at 741.
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The Court next addressed the sales tax question. The Court indi-
cated that a purchasing agent relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and a contractor exists when a sale to the contractor is a real
and symbolic sale to the United States.1°4 A contractor may be a
purchasing agent without being an instrumentality of the federal gov-
ernment. 0 5 A federal purchasing agent is constitutionally exempt
from state sales tax. 106 Thus, the Court reaffirms Kern-Limerick's
holding,0 7 but the Court interprets Kern-Limerick as merely barring
state taxes legally incident on the United States. 08
The Court factually distinguished United States v. New Mexico
from Kern-Limerick. 109 The Court found that the difference caused
104. See Id
105. See id The Court stated that a federal purchasing agent "can be so closely
associated with the Government, and so lack an independent role in the purchase, as
to make the sale. . . a sale to the United States, even though the purchasing agent
has not otherwise been incorporated into the Government." .d The Court noted
that such had been the Court's determination in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347
U.S. 110 (1954). See id The Court further noted that Kern-Limerick had concluded
that "a sale to the contractor was in effect a sale to the United States, and therefore
not a proper subject for the Arkansas sales tax." Id The Court went on to find the
Kern-Limerick rule inapplicable to United States v. New Mexico. The Court's indica-
tion that Kern-Limerick applies to any federal purchasing agent demonstrates the cur-
rent Court's adoption of Kern-Limerick. The Court's detailed analysis of Kern-
Limerick and its efforts to distinguish Kern-Limerick from United States V. New Mex-
ico further demonstrate that Kern-Limerick remains good law. See infra notes 122,
123 and accompanying text concerning the Court's distinction between Kern-Limerick
and United States v. New Mexico.
106. See 455 U.S. at 741-742.
107. See id. at 742. The Court's declaration that federal immunity must be based
on more than traditional agency concepts is incongruous with its failure to overrule
Kern-Limerick. Kern-Limerick found immunity on the basis of a traditional agency
concept. See supra note 92 for a discussion of agency concepts. It makes no sense to
expressly require more than an agent-principal relationship for immunity while re-
taining an agency-based precedent, but that is the effect of United States . New-Mex-
ico. See 455 U.S. at 736, 742.
108. See id at 1386 (quoting United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 699, 459
n.7 (1977)). The Court apparently ratified Kern-Limerick. See supra note 105. The
Court then stated that Kern-Limerick "'stands only for the proposition that the State
may not impose a tax the legal incidence of which falls on the Federal Govern-
ment."' 455 U.S. at 742 (quoting United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452,
459 n.7 (1977)). Thus, the Court downplayed the importance of Kern-Limerick's con-
tract language. See id See supra notes 50-59 for a discussion of Kern-Limerick.
Nevertheless, Kern-Limerick's primary message is that contract language can confer
federal immunity. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 710. The Court only confuses by failing
to overrule Kern-Limerick while trying to circumvent the import of the case.
109. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 743. The Court found: 1) The
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the contractors in United States v. New Mexico to fall short of
purchasing agent status.110 Thus, the Court held that the contractors
in United States v. New Mexico do not qualify for constitutional im-
munity from state sales tax."'
United States v. New Mexico is noteworthy for its reevaluation of
the M'Culloch doctrine." 2 The Court attempts to balance the United
States' interests with state interests in light of the history of the im-
munity doctrine." 3 Thus, the Court protects federal supremacy by
retaining absolute immunity from state taxes for the United States
and its instrumentalities. At the same time, the Court's restrictive
approach to claims that a contractor is a federal instrumentality per-
mits broad state taxing powers. The Court's refusal to read
M'Culloch as proclaiming immunity only from discriminatory state
taxes recognized 160 years of the doctrine's development." 4 Never-
theless, the Court virtually ignores federal immunity cases between
M'Culloch and Dravo. Thus, the Court clearly signals its repudiation
of an expansive interpretation of the doctrine.
United States v. New Mexico is also noteworthy for limiting Kern-
Limerick's agency exception to the legal incidence text for federal
immunity from state taxes." 5 The Court expressly states that tradi-
tional notions of agency do not justify constitutional immunity." 6
The Court only considers the alleged agent-principal relationship
New Mexican contractors purchased in their own names, while Kern-Limerick's con-
tractors purchased in the name of the United States. 2) New Mexico's vendors wdre
not informed of the United States' interest in the contractors' purchases, while Kern-
Limerick's contractors clearly expressed that interest to vendors. But see supra note
14 (vendors arguably had notice). 3) The government refuses to formally designate
the New Mexican contractors as agents, while it contractually named Kern-Limerick's
contractors as agents. 4) The New Mexican contractors could purchase without ad-
vance approval, Kern-Limerick's contractors could not. See United States v. New
Mexico, 455 U.S. at 743.
110. See 455 U.S. at 742-43.
III. Seeid
112. See id at 730-738. See upra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Court's reevaluation of the M'Culloch doctrine.
113. See 455 U.S. at 735-36.
114. See id at 733.
115. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's treatment of Kern-Limerick. See also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text for a general discussion of Kern-Limerick.
116. 455 U.S. at 736.
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with respect to sales tax levies on purchasing agents. lI" Even then,
the Court does not find immunity despite substantial similarity be-
tween Kern-Limerick and United States v. New Mexico. 118 Thus, it
appears that an agency theory supports a claim of constitutional im-
munity only under the facts of Kern-Limerick.
Finally, United States v. New Mexico is noteworthy because it
states that a contractor benefiting from its relationship with the
United States cannot be a federal instrumentality. The test asks if a
body receives any material benefit from its relationship with the
United States. If so, the body is independent of the federal govern-
ment." 9 If independent of the United States, the body is not a fed-
eral instrumentality. 20 Conversely, a body performing a task for the
United States can be a federal instrumentality only if it receives no
benefit from its relationship to the government. While the Court did
not state that all bodies performing tasks for the United States with-
out benefit are federal instrumentalities, such a rule is probable.1
2
'
The Court's definition makes it very unlikely that any contractor
working for the federal government can qualify as a federal instru-
mentality. The test and definition are long awaited additions to the
law.
United States v. New Mexico warrants criticism because its failure
to overrule Kern-Limerick 122 maintains "wooden formalism" in the
117. See id. at 738-44.
118. See id at 742-43. The Court distinguished Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,
347 U.S. 110 (1954) from United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). See also
supra note 109 for a discussion of the Court's contrast of New Mexico and Kern-
Limerick. Nevertheless, the cases are similar. Both cases involved contractors doing
business for the United States. In both cases the government retained the right to
control the contractors' actions. Both cases involved state sales taxes levied on
purchases for the United States. The federal government ultimately paid the tax in
both cases. In both cases the contractors made purchases with federal funds. In both
cases the contractors benefited from their relationship with the federal government.
See Brief for the United States at 26-29.
119. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 720.
120. See id at 740-41.
121. See id at 740 n.13. There, the Court discusses United States v. Livingston,
179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. S.C. 1959) affdper curiam 364 U.S. 281 (1960). The Court
emphasizes the "extraordinary" nature of the Livingston contract, the contractor's
contribution to the defense effort, the contractor's action without hope of gain, and
the fact that the contractor received no benefit from his effort. See 455 U.S. at 740
n.13.
122. See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954). See also supra
notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kern-Limerick.
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law.' 2 3 The facts and effects of Kern-Limerick and United States v.
New Mexico are substantially identical. In both cases, private con-
tractors performed work for the United States. The contractors
benefitted from their relationships with the United States. The con-
tractors bought goods with government funds. Only the United
States had an ownership interest in the goods. In both cases, the
states intended to tax the contractors. While all the contracts placed
the economic burden of contractors' taxes on the United States, only
the Kern-Limerick contracts expressly made the contractors purchas-
ing agents for the United States. Only contractual language differen-
tiates Kern-Limerick from United States v. New Mexico.
In United States v. New Mexico, the Court declares that a constitu-
tional immunity cannot rest on such technical considerations as the
government's advance funding system."' If it could, the Court cau-
tions, an administrator could change the constitutional line by chang-
ing contract language.' 25 Despite that warning, the Court's failure to
overrule Kern-Limerick permits administrators to draw the constitu-
tional line by designating a contractor a purchasing agent. The
Court, therefore, misses an opportunity to eliminate a legal loophole
that raises form above substance.
The result in United States v. New Mexico advances the substantial
state interest in financing state government. The Court clearly sig-
nals its intention to scrutinize closely all claims of constitutional im-
munity from state taxation for federal contractors. While federal
purchasing agents will remain immune from state sales taxes, the
Court expressly states that traditional notions of agency do not justify
constitutional immunity in other situations. Furthermore, the Court
indicates that it will find contractors to be purchasing agents only in
narrowly circumscribed circumstances. The Court also affirms its
lack of concern for the federal government's economic burden result-
ing from federal contractors' state taxes. By severly limiting the
availability of constitutional immunity for federal agents while dis-
counting a state tax's economic burden on the federal government,
the Court demonstrates its intention to protect state tax bases at the
federal government's expense. Parties desiring immunity from state
123. See supra note 56.
124, 455 U.S. at 737.
125. See id
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taxes for federal contractors should petition Congress, not the
Court. 1
26
C Crady Swisher III
126. See id at 744. In Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952) the
Supreme Court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. 262, 67 Stat. 575,
conferred on Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contractors immunity from state
taxation. 342 U.S. at 236. Congress, apparently responding to the Court's construc-
tion, amended the Act to put AEC contractors on equal footing with other federal
contractors in regard to state taxes. See S. Rep. No. 694, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1953). The Senate report on the amendment indicates the drafters' belief that "con-
stitutional immunity does not extend to . . . contractors of the Federal Govern-
ment." See id at 2. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Congress may grant statutory
immunity from state taxes. See First Ag. Nat'l Bank of Berkshire Cnty. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968) (statute barred a state tax on a national bank). Con-
gress' action following the Court's Roane-Anderson decision, however, suggests that
Congress is not likely to provide immunity from state taxes for all contractors doing
business with the United States.
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